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Introduction
The aim of the paper is an investigation on the role of demand upon innovation.
Despite the decades-long debate on the issue, a comprehensive analytical formulation is still lacking. This paper attempts to fill this gap by proposing a model where demand, conceived as a peculiar blend of two conditions, market size and users' sophistication, drives incentives to innovate. These two conditions have been always considered crucial to the understanding of the influence of demand upon innovation and section 2 resumes the debate and the main conclusions so far achieved by the literature. Section 3 puts forward a framework explaining the way these two dimensions might pull innovation: the evolution of various industries suggested that there exists a tension between the manufacture of a standardized good and the introduction of specific varieties (Piore and Sabel 1984, Guerzoni 2004 ). Firms can combine these two tasks together only to certain extent because they require two alternative organizations of production. This section advocates the idea that market size and consumers' sophistication play an important role in determining both the optimal organization of production and, consequently, innovative behaviour at the firm level.
In section 4, the paper presents a model exploring this mechanism. It first analyses the impact of these dimensions on the innovative output. Secondly, it shows that their interplay can be used to group sectors according to the patterns of demand they are facing. Each pattern is characterised by an idiosyncratic blend of size of demand and consumers´ sophistication and, as a result, by a distinctive pattern of production and innovation. Finally, this paper explores the dynamic properties of the model with a numerical simulation and discusses the relation between this work and standard literature on industry life cycle. The conclusions suggest a few remarks about the limits of the model and new lines of research.
Previous literature
Concerning the influence of demand upon innovation, two streams of literature can be identified. They root in the seminal works by Schmookler (1962 Schmookler ( , 1966 and Myers and Marquis (1969) . Schmookler conceived demand as the size of the market: in his view, if an improvement either in the production techniques or in the product quality ensures a higher mark-up, demand acts as a multiplier on the increased gain per unit and, therefore, grants higher profits. Being innovation an economic activity driven by market incentives, a large demand pulls innovation because it grants a high stream of expected profits. Schmookler empirically tested this hypothesis on a dataset of selected sectors and provided evidence supporting his theory. However, relatively recent studies (Scherer 1982 , Kleinknecht and Verspagen 1990) highlighted that the size of the market is a good proxy for the expected demand only for large and established industries and for process and incremental product innovations because they have little impact on the market structure. In other cases, innovation might impinge upon the market structure by augmenting firms' market shares, by cannibalizing existing products, and by modifying the size of the market itself.
Analytical models of patent race (for a review Reinganum 1981 ) and of endogenous market structure (among others Sutton 1998 , Jovanovich and Rob 1987 and Klepper 1996 have deeply analysed this issue.
The analytical conceptualization of Schmookler´s approach roots in the pathbreaking article by Arrow (1962) . Arrow's mechanism, linking the size of the market with incentives to invest, is the core assumption of various economic models ranging from models of innovation and market structure, of biased technical change, to new growth theories (among others Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980 , Samuelson 1965 , Romer 1986 ). Precisely new growth theories pinpointed the most interesting development for the subject matter of this paper. One of their main result has been that larger economies should grow faster for different reasons, among which the high level of incentives provided by the market size.
However, Jones (1995a) empirically falsified this result. As explanation, he suggested that the reason might lie in the lack of inter-temporal spillovers and in the resulting decrease of productivity of the R&D sector, the engine of growth (Jones 1995b This latter motivation is demand led because the survival of different solutions requires some degree of heterogeneity on the demand side. Otherwise, only the most efficient solution for the economy would survive on the market. In sum, the size of the market does impinge upon incentives to invention, but both the effect of innovation on market structure as suggested by Scherer (1982) and Kleinknecht and Verspagen (1990) and the heterogeneity on the demand side should be taken into account.
A second group of studies conceived demand as a source of information rather than as an incentive (Myers and Marquis 1969 , Langrish et Al. 1972 , Ienson 1969 , National Science Foundation 1959, Rothwell and Freeman 1972 , Freeman 1968 , Berger 1975 , Boyden 1976 , Lionetta 1977 . The main outcome of these qualitative studies has been the empirical evidence that firms perceive demand as the most important source of ideas. The drawback of this approach is the vagueness of the concept of demand they used. As explained by Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) , and Dosi (1982) , in order "to conclude that it is demand that drives innovation, market must clearly be distinguished from the potentially limitless set of human needs" (Dosi 1982 p. 150, bold added). Otherwise, the necessary outcome is the "incapability of defining the why and when of certain technological developments instead of others and of a certain timing instead of other" (ibid.).
The concept of lead user, as introduced by Von Hippel, precisely deals with this critique. Lead users are "consumers whose present strong needs will become general in a marketplace months or years in the future" (von Hippel 1986, p.792). Similarly, Teubal (1979) suggests that the influence of demand upon innovation depends on "need determinateness, the extent to which preferences are specified (or need satisfaction is expressed) in terms of product classes, functions and features" (Teubal 1979 showed that this is especially true for radical product improvements. Guerzoni (2007) formally proved that sophistication is a necessary condition for observing a heterogeneous structure of consumers' preferences. This is relevant to the aim of this paper because it allows reducing the complexity of a conceptualization of the demand side by modelling heterogeneity as a function of sophistication. On this basis, demand is defined as both the blend of market size and consumers' sophistication.
The next section puts forward the second building block of the paper. It discusses the tension between standardization and variety, and shows how the optimal location choices in this trade-off are driven also by the relevant dimensions of demand.
Standardization and variety
The trade-off between standardization and variety is a crucial source of industrial dynamics (David 1994 , David and Rothwell 1996 , Weitzman 1992 ).
On the one hand, many benefits derive from standardization such as a greater predictability of the outcome, faster learning economies due to simplification and routinisation, scale economies, easier production of complementary assets and components' interfaces, and network externalities. In other words, standardization, by creating order and, consequently, by reducing uncertainty, allows an efficient systematization of the production processes. Moreover standardization does not impinge on quality as often is believed: "the alleged sacrifice of quality to quantity is a myth" (Rae 1965, p.53) . In contrast, standardization leads to higher accuracy standards.
The other side of the story is that a real trade-off exists between standardization and variety: "the consumer gets lower costs but at the expense of variety" (ibid.). Variety might be desirable for many reasons: there can be a taste for variety in the consumers because, as David (1994) emphasised, "consumers may have demand for intrinsic novelty as means for combating the malaise of boredom". Secondly, they can have a preference for variety as a way to seek distinction (Swann 2001) , or variety can better fit their preferences (Lancaster 1990 for a review).
Moreover, the economy as a whole might take advantage from variety. First, Saviotti and Pyka (2003) warn against the risk of a low production of variety.
He explains that, if a system produces the same amount of output with a decreasing amount of input (notably labour) due to the productive gains from standardization, it might be not sustainable in the long run: indeed the creation of variety both via new products and via new machineries is considered as a necessary condition to overcome technological unemployment. Secondly, David (1994) admonishes against the possibility of a lock-in: a standardized product can generate important network effects and, therefore, erect high entry barriers, which hinder the diffusion of new products.
Firms have to face the same trade-off as well: the production of a standardized good allows a quick exploitation of learning economies, a higher predictability, and a reduction of costs of gathering information. However, competition in markets for standardized goods is tough, price based, and characterised by small mark-ups. On the contrary, the production of variety increases the quality perceived by consumers, their willingness to pay and firms' market power.
Conversely, it requires information about consumers' requirements and ad hoc technologies, and increases the uncertainty of future profits.
As many studies highlighted (Piore and Sabel 1984) , firms can combine mass production with the creation of specific varieties only to a certain extent. In markets, where we observe heterogeneous consumers, large producers do introduce some degree of product differentiation, but those competitors supplying a changing variety of oddments are typically niche players.
This event occurs because the strategic choice between the manufacture of a standardized good or, conversely, the generation of a specific variety has a deep impact on a firm organization of production. The production of a standardized good requires high mechanical accuracy achievable only by both the division of labour in simple steps and the consequent substitution of labour with machinery. The production of variety, on the contrary, is closer to the idea of craft production because it requires the development of new ideas that, obviously, cannot be performed by a machine. Thus, in the latter case, machineries are conceived as an extension of workers' skills, rather then a substitute, and they are introduced to augment workers' ability of producing variety (Piore and Sabel 1984, p.19) .
These two modes of production involve different innovative efforts at firm level. Standardization requires innovations improving the mechanization in the process of production, for instance by increasing the exactness of coordination and the degree of interchangeability among components. On the other hand, the creation of variety requires innovation in product design, marketing, and customer care: the objective of creating a new variety is how to better satisfy consumers' preferences, the goal of standardization is cost reduction (ibid.).
The purpose of the paper is precisely to disclose the link between demand, as a blend of market size and consumers' sophistication, and the optimal location in the trade-off between standardization and variety. For a firm, standardization means a high break-even point and requires consumers with a low degree of sophistication because homogeneity and low taste for variety are necessary conditions to accept a "one-fits-all" product design. The creation of variety, on the contrary, leads to high costs in gathering information for producing the specific variety users are looking for. For this reason, it requires consumers to be sophisticated, able to specify their needs and wants, and willing to pay for their satisfaction.
In sum, the peculiar mix of market size and users' sophistication contribute to the definition of the optimal location in the standardization-variety trade-off and, thus, of the mode of production. Each mode of production leads to a peculiar pattern of innovation. The following paragraphs analytically define the two dimensions of demand and explore the outcome of their interaction.
The model
Foreword
The model presented below is a model with vertical innovation generated in a Building on this tradition, in this model there is the pioneering attempt to take into account the degree of users' sophistication. As previously shown, sophistication can be defined as the degree of consumers' awareness of their needs. This awareness has two implications: first, it is positively correlated with consumers' ability to communicate their needs to firms. For this reason, the probability of producing a successful innovation in the model is a function of consumers' sophistication. Secondly, as discussed above, sophistication impinges also on the level of heterogeneity, captured in the model by the number of submarkets. For this reason, also the number of submarkets will depend on the degree of sophistication. sophistication. α plays two roles: first, it impinges upon the quality of information flowing from consumers to firms: the higher α is, the easier it will be for a firm to introduce of a successful product innovation.
The model: structure
Secondly, α captures the idea that sophistication impinges on the structure of demand as well. Consider the M individuals partitioned in N submarkets of equal size, where S j is the generic submarket. Assume that the number of submarkets is a proxy for demand heterogeneity. As discussed before, the degree of heterogeneity depends on users' sophistication. Thus, the greater α is, the higher is the number of submarkets. At the one extreme (α = 1), each single consumer represents a submarket; when α is equal to 0, on the contrary, there is only one submarket including all of the consumers. This is the case of homogenous demand. Thus
In each period consumers face the decision of buying a good of a standard quality, q , or a top quality, q j *, good. Standard quality goods are horizontally homogenous and they match consumers' preferences in each submarket. Top quality goods, on the contrary, fit only the submarket S j they are developed for.
This hypothesis captures the empirical evidence that vertical product improvements are intrinsically associated with a fine-tuning on the preferences of a specific market segment.
In each period, consumers buy one unit of the good if it confers a positive utility U. If more than one good is available, they buy the one granting the highest utility according to the following utility function:
where d is an indictor variable suggesting that a top quality good confers a positive utility only to those consumers who are part of the submarket the good is developed for. Since consumers decisions are not the focus of this model, assume that q is large enough to grant always a positive utility.
Concerning the supply side, firms can produce a good of a standard quality q incurring in standard marginal costs c . In each period, firms can engage in either product or process R&D. The former improves product quality from q to q j *, the latter reduces marginal cost from c to c*. Each time a firm introduces a product (process) innovation, assume that the former best practice became the standard quality (production cost). Firms have constant average costs and, thus, in equilibrium the number of firms operating in the economy will be indefinite.
Competition for innovation takes the form of a patent race: the first to invent receives monopolist profits until the next innovation is introduced (Reinganum 1985 ).
Product innovations occur randomly following a Poisson arrival rate of ε for each monetary unit invested in product R&D. Thus, average waiting time for the next product innovation, if a monetary unit is invested, is ε 1 . Due to the additivity of Poisson processes, the flow of product innovation at each time t is given by:
where ε can be also interpreted as a proxy for the technology opportunities and w j,t is the investment in product R&D at time t, by a firm operating in the submarket S j . Thus, average waiting time for the next product innovation in submarket j is t j w , 1 ε . If the economy is at time t, we define t+1 the time when the next innovation occurs. Because competition for innovation is structured as a patent race, the average waiting time for next innovation does not depend on the aggregate investment, but on the investment of the single firm. In equilibrium, an indefinite number firms will be investing the same amount of resources. However, only the first firm to invent will have positive returns for its investment. This is a standard assumption in the literature of patent race without technological spillovers.
In this model, all the submarkets are of equal size; thus, there is no reason why a firm should prefer a submarket instead of another one. Consequently, we assume that firms randomly choose the submarket where they operate.
Similarly, the flow of process innovation at each time t is: 
The model: results
Lemma 1
At each point in time the firm producing the top quality good in each submarket sets the price (q*q + c ) and the firm producing at marginal cost c* sets the price c .
Proof
The proof shows first that p = (q*q + c ) is the best price strategy for firms producing the high quality good, when standard firms sell at price c . Secondly, the proof shows that, given this price, the firm innovating in process technology sets the price c .
Assume that firms with the best production technology set the price c . Thus, the limit price to exclude them from the market should satisfy
that is the price that makes consumers indifferent between buying the high quality good and the low quality good. Assuming that consumers break the tie in favour of firms producing the quality good:
We assume that p(q*,t) is always non negative. It is then straightforward to prove that c is the optimal price set by firms with the best process technology.
If p< c , due to the inelasticity of the demand curve deriving form the utility function, they would sell the same quantity but at a lower price and, thus, they would not maximise their profits. If p> c they would face competition from non-innovative firms.
Lemma 2
Expected profits for a firm producing the top quality in a submarket are:
is the potential market faced by a product innovator under the assumption that consumers are evenly distributed across submarkets. Pr(α) is the probability that a product innovation meets consumers' needs, and (q*q ) is the mark-up.
Lemma 3
Expected profits for firms producing with lower marginal cost are:
The firm with the best process technology serves all the market not covered by
, and ( c -c*) is the mark-up per unit.
Proposition 1
In equilibrium, in each period, R&D efforts are:
where r is the discount factor.
Proof
We first prove (9) . Firms aiming at introducing product innovation, choose w j,t in order to maximize the flow of expected profit over time:
where W t+1 is the value of introducing the next innovation weighted with the probability that this event occurs. Free entry in the R&D to introduce product innovation ensures zero profits conditions. From Kuhn-Tucker conditions: . The denominator is also known as obsolescence adjusted interest rate and shows that the greater the amount of resources devoted to R&D in the sector, the shorter the period of monopolist profit and, thus, the smaller the incentives to invention. Moreover, equation (13) illustrates that the incumbent owning the best quality does not invest in R&D: the value of investment is not W t+1, but the strictly smaller W t+1 -W t , that is the value of introducing an innovation corrected with the loss of value due to the cannibalization of its own monopolistic position. Equation (13) can be re-arranged as:
The flow value of owning the next best technology is equal to the monopolist profits in the submarket S j minus the probability of loosing all the value because a new innovation is introduced. In equilibrium, both Kuhn-Tucker conditions and (14) should be fulfilled. Thus, substituting (12) and (7) in (14) we obtain (9) .
Mutatis mutandis, the proof holds also for R&D investment in process innovation (equation 10).
Proposition 2
In Equilibrium, at each time the flow of product and process innovation is:
Consider the case when R&D investments are positive. Substituting (3) in (9) and (4) in (10) and re-arranging, we obtain (15) and (16) .
Corollary 1
An increase in market size has always a positive impact on both product and process innovation.
Proof:
Corollary 2
An increase in consumers' sophistication has a negative impact on process innovation and an uncertain one on product innovation.
Proof
Note that for (20) the sign of the derivate depends on the elasticities of Pr (α) and N(α) with respect to α. Indeed
Multiplying both sides of the equation times α and rearranging we obtain:
that is:
where ε pr(α),α and ε N(α),α are the α-elasticities of respectively Pr(α) and N(α).
Corollary 3
A necessary condition to observe at least one firm introducing a product innovation is:
Directly from (15) .
Corollary 4
Directly from (16) . Figure 4 is a qualitative resume -and not an isomorphic representation -of the firms´ innovative behaviour in the economy and, on this premise, figure 5 suggests a taxonomy of markets: there exist passive markets where demand does not pull innovation at all. The small size of the market and the low users' sophistication do not make investments in innovation a profitable activity. Both product and process innovations, if any, are due to a "technology push"; as in the Schumpeterian hypothesis, innovation results from an act of will made by the entrepreneur or from the efficiency of R&D laboratories.
The model: comments
In mass markets, all of the requirements for the production of a standard good are fulfilled, that is firms find it profitable to invest in process R&D and produce a standard good. These markets could be mainly mass markets for consumers´ goods and commodities, but they can also represent a market for standardized producers´ goods, like for instance Personal Computers, raw materials or for producers´ goods were user-producer interactions do not matter very much. Because of the low degree of sophistication, it is more profitable for firms to seek cost reducing process innovation and exploit the size of the market rather than following differentiation strategies. New radical innovations, if any, are due to technological breakthroughs, rather then to demand stimuli. These markets fit very well the "demand pull" empirical evidence found by Schmookler.
In niche markets innovation is oriented toward the generation of variety. The finally overcome the trade-off between standardization and variety. So far, mass customization has not been put to work, but it could be observed an attempt by large firms to improve the flexibility of the process technology in terms of both quantity and variety.
The patterns of demand and the industry life cycle
A property of the model is that neither past nor future has an influence on the research efforts at a given time. Only the two relevant demand parameters, size and sophistication, and the control variables for technologies opportunities, ε and δ, determine R&D levels. This property implies that, at each point in time, optimal investments crucially depend on M and α. By varying these parameters over time, it is possible to depict the evolution of demand patterns and, thus, the resulting dynamics in firms' innovative behaviour. c. An increasing size of the market. d. A small initial degree of sophistication. e. A degree of sophistication is initially increasing, then decreasing, and increasing again.
Assume that the degree of sophistication at time t, (α t ), can be proxied by the ratio of sophisticated consumer (S t ) and the size of the market (M t ). Under this assumption, condition 4 can be re-written as
Where t is the time and M & and the growth rate of M and S. This formulation, comparing the increase of the size of the market with the increase of the sophisticated consumer, shows that industry life cycle is only one of the possible history, although a very plausible one. The plausibility derives from the fact that the diffusion of a product often follows a logistic curve that is a function with a small positive derivative both at early and late stage of the diffusion and a high growth in between ( fig. 8 ).
The following paragraphs show the results of a numerical simulation that reproduces this evolution path of demand.
The purpose of the exercise is purely a methodological one because an analysis of consumption is beyond the purpose of this paper. However, it shows further applications of the model as, for instance, the replication of an historical dynamics within a market, the implementation of counterfactual analysis, and the prediction of future scenarios.
The simulation has been run assuming that a market for a product grows along an S-shaped curve. A common solution for modelling the diffusion path is the assumption that market growth is positively correlated with the size of the market in each time and the number of potential adopters: (25) ) (
The model considers the degree of sophistication as the percentage of sophisticated users: Given these conditions, equations (15) and (16) determine the flow of both process and product innovations.
The following tables depict the outcome of a model parameterization that replicates dynamics in the steel industry. Figure 9 describes the evolution of demand and Figure 10 portrays the number of product and process innovations over time. When demand is nothing more than a niche market, process innovations are rare, while there are various product innovations. As demand moves toward a mass market, the number of process innovations steadily increases, whilst product innovations disappear. In product life cycle theory, this event corresponds to the appearance of a dominant design. Finally, when the sector reaches a de-maturity stage, i.e. a large market but very sophisticated, we observe the coexistence of both process and product innovations.
As a result, this model replicates the standard life cycle of an industry.
Although this is a plausible story, because it mainly derives from the reasonable assumption of an S-shape diffusion curve, it is still a special case. Thus, this model analytically reduces the product life cycle theory to a special case of a more complex framework where diffusion and learning, by coevolving together, shape firms´ production decisions and innovative output at the aggregate level. Undeniably, by varying the assumptions on the evolution of both market size and consumers' sophistication, it is possible to generate alternative outcomes such as bifurcations in the technological trajectories or the non-existence of a dominant design, which have been recently observed in many sectors (Windrum 2003, Windrum and Frenken 2003) .
These considerations hold under peculiar assumptions on technology, captured by ε and δ. It is straightforward that if technology because of its rigidities does not allow an easy generation of variety, firms will rather focus on standardization despite market requirements and the other way round.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to improve our understanding of the influence of demand case and alternative assumptions on market growth and consumer' sophistication lead to different outcomes. Nevertheless, this paper does not suggest that only the demand side matters. Indeed, these results hold only under the ceteris paribus condition on the technology side. The aim of the paper was not to add a new contribution on the "demand pull" vs. "technology push" debate, but to explore the mechanism on the demand side. Generally, whether ceteris paribus hold or not and, thus, whether technological or demand factors prevail is an empirical question.
